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Am t o f I

STATEMENT I )!• TMK ISSUES
JL NO. I
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS CONTRARY TO THE
FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE STATE OF THE LAW AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-5 IN THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE.
ISSUE NO. Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-10 IN THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
nTr
A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE.
. IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED VARIOUS NASD RULES IN THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY
APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A
VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE
PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION
OF THIS RULE AND THAT SEVERAL OF THE STATED RULES DO NOT AND
DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION.
ISSUE NO. V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT
AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, ARE NOT AVAILABLE WITHOUT
A FINDING OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HER COUNTERCLAIM.

ISSUE NO. VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING MATTERS
WHICH WERE NOT AT ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, ARE NOT
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE FACTS OR ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. THE
IMPROPER MATTERS INCLUDE THAT A STOCK SALE CANNOT TAKE PLACE
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE IN POSSESSION; THAT PLAINTIFF
ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE DEFENDANT'S STOCK TO PREVENT PROFIT
TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT; THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE
DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL; THAT THE REASON
THE DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED HER STOCK CERTIFICATE FROM THE
TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME ALLEGED SCHEME; THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE TRANSACTIONS WITHIN
FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION; THAT A CONVERSISON OF
DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED; THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY
OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER
VENTURE CONSOLIDATED INC.; THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING
PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED.

STATUTES AND RULES VERBATIM
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Sec. 10.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or

indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange—
Sec. 10(b) To use or employ, inconnection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Section 28 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Sec. 28 <a) The rights and remedies provided by this
title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction
of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess
of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the

securities commission <or any agency or officer performing
like functions) of any State over any securities or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisins of
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.

No

State law which prohibits or regulates the making or
promoting of wagering or gaming contracts, or the operation
of "bucket shops" or other similar or related activities,
shall invalidate any put, call, straddle, option, privilege,
or other security, or apply to any activity which is
incidental or related to the offer, purchase, sale,
exercise, settlement, or closeout of any such instrument, if
such instrument is traded pursuant to rules and regulations
of a self-regulatory organization that are filed with the
Commission pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act.
UCft 7QA-8-319
A Contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless
<a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker
sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for
sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a
defined or stated price; or

(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment
has been made but the contract is enforceable under this
provision only to the extent of such delivery or payment; or
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the sale or purchase and sufficient against the sender under
paragraph (a) has been received by the party against whom
enforcement is sought and he has failed to send written
objection to its contents within ten days after its receipt;

or
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought actaiits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a
contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of described
securities at a defined or stated price.

Securities and Exchange Comroiggipn Rvle lPfr-5
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
<b> to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or
<c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Securities and Exchange Cpromissipn Rvle IQfr-lQ
See Addendum attached hereto.

National Aggo^utipn pf Securities Dealers Sectjpn 12
Sec.

12.

A member at or before the completion of each

transaction with a customer shall give or send to such
customer written notification disclosing <1> whether such
member is acting as a broker for such customer, as a dealer
for his own account, as a broker for some other person, or
as a broker for such customer and some other person; and (2)
in any case in which such member is acting as a broker for
such customer or for both such customer, and some other
person, either the name of the person from whom the security
was purchased or to whom it was sold for such customer and
the date and time when such transaction took place or the
fact that such information will be furnished upon the

request of such customer, and the source and amount of any
commission or other remuneration received or to be received
by such member in connection with the transact ion.

National ftggpcUUon of gggyritUg Dealer? gecUpn 19
Sec.

18.

No member shall effect any transaction in, or

induce the purchase or sale of, any security by means of any
manipulative, deceptive or other fradulent device or
contrivance.
National Association of Securities Dealers Section 21(a&b)
Sec. 21.
Requirements
(a) Each member shall keep and preserve books,
accounts, records, memorandum, and correspondence in
conformity with all applicable laws, rules, regulations and
statements of policy promulgated thereunder and with the
rules of this Association.
Information on accounts
<b) Each member shall maintain accounts of customers in
such form and manner as to show the following information:
name, address, and whether the customer is legally of age;
the signature of the registered representative introducing

the account and the signature of the member or the partner,
officer or manager accepting the account for the member.

If

the customer is associated with or employed by another
member, this fact must be noted.

In discretionary accounts,

the member shall also record the age or approximate age and
occupation of the customer as well as the signature of each
person authorized to exercise discretion in such account.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN CAPITAL AND SECURITIES,
INC.
Plaint iff-Appellant,
No. 870056

-vHELEN KNUDSVIG,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose out of the sale of securities by the
Defendant and her failure to deliver the certificate to
finalize the transaction resulting in a purchase of
securities to close the sale transaction.

A Complaint was

filed on December 19, 1984 for recovery of the loss
occasioned by the failure to deliver the certificate for the
securities sold.

A Counterclaim was filed and amended

alleging violations of Rule 10b-5, Rule lOb-10 and various
NASD rules.

Trial was held October 16 and 20, 1986 before

the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.

Judgment was entered

November 10, 1986 in favor of the Defendant for punitive
damages only in the amount of $10,000.

A Motion to Alter or

Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
was filed on November 10, 1986 and denied February 3, 1987.
Appeal was taken to this Court by the Plaintiff on February
3, 1987.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff is a securities Broker-Dealer licensed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah
Securities Division. (Page 7 ) . Defendant was a customer who
purchased securities through Plaintiff and numerous other
brokerage firms in Salt lake and Ogden, Utah. (Page 10, 72,
416, 422, 463).
Prior to 1984, Defendant purchased in an Underwriting
through Plaintiff 20,000 shares of stock of Venture
Consolidated, Inc. (Venture) for a total price of *200.0Q.
(Page 416). The offering of the Venture stock was an
unspecified purpose offering wherein Venture proposed to
raise funds and then attempt to enter into a profitable
business opportunity.

Pursuant to the Underwriting, the

Transfer Agent, Interwest Transfer, was to deliver directly
to the Defendant, her purchased shares of stock. (Page 417).
On July 26, 1984, Venture proposed the adoption by the
shareholders of a proposition to acquire for stock, Big 0
Tires, Inc., Snow Bros., Inc., S&H Corporation and D&J
Corporation, all of which were Utah franchisees of Big 0
Tires. (Exhibit 2P). Defendant acknowledged receipt of
Notice of this proposed merger.
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(Page 401). The Venture

Shareholders approved the aquisit ions on September 27, 1984
at a special meeting of shareholders and changed the name of
the Corporation to Tires, Inc. (Tires) and also approved a
20 for 1 reverse split* (Page 72).
On or about September 13, 1984, Plaintiff's
representative, Louis Babcock (Babcock) went to Defendant's
place of business and notified Defendant that her shares of
Venture had increased from $.01 to approximately *.15 tO
••17 per share and asked if Defendant desired to sell her
shares. (Page 410-2,25).

Defendant declined. (Page 425-6).

Defendant later attempted to contact Babcock, and being
unable to do so, contacted Plaintiff's office in Salt Lake
City where she spoke to Richard Davis (Davis), a registered
representative for Plaintiff. (Page 440-3).

After a

lengthly discussion Defendant requested the sale of her
shares of stock of Venture and also requested that the
commission on the sale be given to Babcock. (Page 444).
Davis, not knowing how to accomplish the sale with
commission being payable to Babcock, and while the Defendant
waited on the phone, contacted Richard L. Parker, the
Executive Vice President of Plaintiff regarding
instructions. (Page 445). Parker wrote a trade ticket
showing the method to ensure the commission was payable to
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Babcock and delivered the ticket to Davis who took the
ticket to Plaintiff's Trading Department which Department
accepted the sale order at *.17 per share. (Page 445-6)•
Davis then returned to the phone and informed Defendant of
the sale and the price of the sale. (Page 448). Several
days later, Defendant again contacted Davis and indicated
she had changed her mind and did not want to sell her stock.
(Page 447-8).
the trade.

Davis informed her that she could not cancel

She asked what to do and Davis requested she

contact her representative, Babcock, for specific
instructions. (Page 448).

Defendant failed to deliver the

stock certificate and Plaintiff's Financial Principal, Kim
H. Johnson, (Johnson) contacted Babcock and instructed him
to contact Defendant concerning the certificate. (Page 469).
Babcock contacted Defendant and she indicated she would
deliver the certificate to Plaintiff's office in Salt Lake.
(Page 469). Approximately one week passed and having not
received the certificate, Johnson again contacted Babcock
and instructed him to contact Defendant.

Babcock contacted

Defendant and was informed that Defendant could not find her
certificate.

Babcock told her how to obtain replacement of

the certificate from Interwest Transfer. (Page 471).
Defendant indicated she would get her husband's help in

- 5-

finding the certificate. (Page 471, 502). Again a length of
time passed and the certificate was not delivered.

Johnson

again contacted Babcock and he again contacted Defendant.
(Page 501-2).

She indicated she could not find the

certificate and had never received it from Interwest
Transfer after the initial underwriting. (Page 471).
Babcock again informed Defendant of the method to replace
the stock certificate. (Page 471).
Defendant then contacted Plaintiff and spoke with
Johnson.

Defendant told Johnson that she had done the trade

with Davis.

(Page 502-4).

Defendant indicated she did not

have the stock. (Page 504). Johnson explained the
replacement procedures, (Page 505) though also informed her
that if she did not deliver the certificate prior to
November 30, 1984, that Plaintiff would buy in stock to
cover her sale and she would be responsible for any losses.
(Page 505).

Defendant became angry and requested the

cancellation of the sale. (Page 505).

Johnson again

reiterated the need to deliver the stock certificate and
ended the conversation.(Page 505).
Defendant failed to deliver the certificate and on
November 30, 1984, Plaintiff purchased for Defendant's
account, stock to cover Defendant's failure to deliver her
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certificate. (Page 505). On December 12, 1984, Plaintiffs
Counsel notified Defendant of the condition of her account
and requested payment of the difficiency created due to
Defendants failure to deliver the stock certificate.
(Exhibit 5D).

Payment was not received and on December 19,

1984, suit was filed by Plaintiff requesting payment. (Page
7),

Defendant counterclaimed violation of 10b-5 and lOb-10

of the Securities Act of 1934 and various NASD regulations.
(Page 70). Trial was held before Judge John F. Wahlquist
and Judgment was entered November 10, 1986 awarding
Defendant punitive damages in the amount of $10,000. (Page
295).

Plaintiff made a motion to Alter or Amend the

Findings, Conclusions and Decree (Page 299) which Motion
Judge Wahlquist denied on February 3, 1987 (Page 318) and
Plaintiff appealed both the Judgment and the denial of the
Motion to Alter or Amend.

Appeal was filed February 3,

1987. (Page 333).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT NO. I
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS CONTRARY TO THE
FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE STATE OF THE LAW AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
ARGUMENT NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-5 IN THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE.
ARGUMENT NO. Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-10 IN THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE.
ARGUMENT NO. IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
VIOLATED VARIOUS NASD RULES IN THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY
APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A
VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE
PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION
OF THIS RULE AND THAT SEVERAL OF THE STATED RULES DO NOT AND
DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION.
ARGUMEMT NO. V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT
AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, ARE NOT AVAILABLE WITHOUT
A FINDING OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HER COUNTERCLAIM.
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ARGUMENT NO. VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING MATTERS
WHICH WERE NOT AT ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, ARE NOT
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE FACTS OR ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. THE
IMPROPER MATTERS INCLUDE THAT A STOCK SALE CANNOT TAKE PLACE
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE IN POSSESSION; THAT PLAINTIFF
ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE DEFENDANT'S STOCK TO PREVENT PROFIT
TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT; THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE
DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL; THAT THE REASON
THE DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED HER STOCK CERTIFICATE FROM THE
TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME ALLEGED SCHEME; THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE TRANSACTIONS WITHIN
FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION; THAT A CONVERSISON OF
DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED; THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY
OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER
VENTURE CONSOLIDATED INC.; THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING
PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED.

- 9-

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT NO. I PLAINTIFF'S CASE
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE ENTERED INTO BY
THE PARTIES.
According to the Restatement of Contracts 2d Section
17, the formation of a contract requires a bargin in where
there is a manifestation of mental assent to the exchange
and a consideration.

The testimony of Davis clearly shows

that the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff and entered into
a contract for the sale of 20,000 shares of Venture
Consolidated stock (now Tires, Inc.).

There was an

agreement to sell shares with the Plaintiff paying for the
shares and the Defendant agreeing to transfer ownership.
Thus there was a bargin, mutually agreed upon with
consideration given on both sides.

The Defendant agreed to

sell her shares and Plaintiff agreed to purchase the
shares.(Page 440-8).

The testimony of Parker supports

Davis7 testimony in that he corrorborates the testimony as
to the conversation on the date of the sale of the stock.
(Page 561). Davis7 testimony of the conversation in which
the sale contract was entered into is further corroborated
by Davis testimony of the subsequent conversation where the
Defendant admitted the existence of the contract. (Page
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447-8).

Exhibit 3P, the trade ticket, which was prepared on

the date of the sale conversation clearly evidences the
sale, confirms the price, date, number of shares, and
participants to the transaction.

Defendants self-serving

denial after suit was filed cannot overcome the evidence of
the contract.

The District Court recognized the existence

of the conversation on the date of the sale in its Findings
thus acknowledging that the Defendant had lied while
testifying that she never made the call on that date. (Page
288-9).

Defendant's claim that it was all a scheme to get

her shares of stock and that the conversation didn't occur
is belied since Davis would not have known if or how many
shares the Defendant had in Venture Consolidated since the
shares were not in the Plaintiffs possession.

That fact

that Davis knew how many shares Defendant posssessed
confirms not only the conversation but Defendant's desire to
sell a specified number of shares.

The price rise and

potential profit on the sale is consistent with the District
Court's findings that the Defendant invested Hin new issues
which will hopefully achieve a quick rise in value." (Page
287). Defendant's knowledge of the sale, which she denies,
is further evidenced by the testimony of Davis that the
Defenant called him again shortly after the sale and said
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she had changed her mind about the sale. (Page 447). The
District Court in its Memorandum Decision recognized the
existence of this conversation. (Page 279). Further the
Defendant admitted to Johnson that she had done the trade
with Davis. (Page 504).
The Babcock testimony shows that not only did the
Defendant know of the sale, but that she intended to
complete her portion of the sale by delivering the stock to
the Plaintiff. (Page 470).
The District Court in its Findings acknowledged that
the Defendant requested the sale but the Dictrict Court
stated that the Defendant's state of mind to be that she
believed she could get out of the sale because she had a
sale previously cancelled. (Page 289). There is no
obligation on the part of the Plaintiff, especially once it
has performed its part of the contract, to agree to void a
contract of sale.

The Defendant did not notify the

Plaintiff at the time of the sale contract of her belief
that she couuld get out of the transactions.

The District

Court infers in its Memorandum Decision that the Plaintiff
knew of or participated in some scheme so that Defendant
would not have her certificate. (Page 277). The evidence
shows that the Transfer Agent, Interwest Transfer, had the
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responsibility to deliver the Certificate to the Defendant
and the the Defendant knew that she could get a replacement
of the certificate through the Transfer Agent. (Page 417)•
An unmarked Exhibit is a letter from the Defendant to the
Transfer Agent which she testified she sent to the Transfer
Agent. (Page 574). The letter clearly shows that prior to
or contemporaneously with the sale contract the Defendant
knew she didn/t have her certificate and that the Transfer
Agent could replace it for her.

That a participant to a

contract believes she can cancel 1 a sale later, even if that
participant honestly believes that to be true, when the
other party has given no indication that it will allow such
a cancellation, is not grounds to determine a contract was
never entered into.

According to the Restatement of

Contracts 2nd Section 153, a contract is voidable only if
the mistake was known to the other party or the effect is
such that enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable.

That the Defendant would have to complete a

sale that she agreed to is clearly not unconscionable
especially when the terms were as agreed by the Defendant.
The Defendant has never shown otherwise.
Pursuant to the request of the Defendant, a sale of
20,000 shares of stock was entered into.
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The fact that the

Plaintiff purchased the shares for itself does not does not
make the sale invalid.

The Defendant knew that the

Plaintiff was a Securities Broker-Dealer who purchased stock
for itself.

That the Plaintiff purchased the stock because

it believed it could make money by so purchasing does not
void the sale.

If this were the case, then any contract for

the purchase of an investment would be invalid.
Proof that the sale accured is further evidenced by the
Plainitff/s records which are consistent in evidencing the
date, price, number of shares sold, and participants to the
contract. (See Exhibits 7P, 3P, 6P, the trade ticket,
confirmation, quarterly account statment.)
Johnson, the keeper of the records (Page

The testimony of
493) shows the

records to have been found in the place and order in the
business records of the Plaintiff as was appropriate for the
date and time of those records. (Page 495-6).

The testimony

and documents clearly show that a contract for sale between
the Plaintiff and Defendant was entered into.

As reflected

on the Account Statement (Exhibit 6P), the Plaintiff
completed its part of the contract by crediting to the
Defendants account payment for the shares sold.

The

parties mutually agreed to the sale of a fixed number of
shares, at a specified price, with consideration agreed to
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be given by both parties.

The Plaintiff completed its

portion of the contract and the Defendant connot now avoid
her respopnsibi1ities under the contract.
Subsequent to the entry of the contract, the Defendant
failed and refused to delilver the required share
certificate to the Plaintiff.

In order to close out

Defendants account and supply the required certificates,
the Plaintiff purchased at or below the fair market price,
sufficient shares of stock to cover the Defendants sale.
(Page 505-7).

There is no evidence contradicting this.

According to the testimony and as shown on the
confirmations of purchase and the account statments
(Exhibits 4P, 6P) the purchase price of the shares was
$8,625.00 which left a balance due and owing to the
Plaintiff by the Defendant of $5,402.20 for which Plaintiff
filed suit and for which it should receive judgment together
with attorney's fees and costs.
The Defendant in her Amended Counter-Claim claims that
the contract is unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of
Frauds.

The District Court in its Findings, without any

specificity as to the Statute of Frauds, stated that the
Plaintiff failed to give notice of the sale transaction.
(Page 289). The Court in its Memorandum Decision stated
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"The question of whether or not a notice of this transaction
was mailed out or not is in conflict.

The Court concludes

that the Plaintiff has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that such a notice was given.8
(Page 277). These are the only references to the notice of
the sale.

The Plaintiff contends that the Court did not

rule that the contract was unenforceable pursuant to the
Statute of Frauds and therefore the District Court erred in
not enforcing the contract of sale.

However, the sale

should be enforced since it complied with the Statute of
Frauds.

Utah Code 70A-8-319 states that a securities

contract is not enforceable unless within a reasonable time
a confirmation of the sale has been received by the
defendant and the defendant has not within ten days sent
written objection to the contents of the confirmation.

The

Defendant in her testimony admits that she did not send
written objection to the confirmation of the sale.
438).

(Page

The only question is whether the confirmation was

received.

The law is clear that where there is proof that

an item has been duly mailed a presumtion of receipt by the
sendee arises.

29 Am Jur 2d, 193;

Campbell vs. Gowans 35

Utah 268, 100 P 397 affirmed in Thiessens v. Department of
Employment Security, Board of Review of the Industrial
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Commission of Utah 663 P2d 72; Lieb v. Webster 190 P2d 701;
Olsen v. Davidson 350 P2d 338.
The testimony of Johnson was that the confirmation was
generated by computer which typed the address on the
confirmation and that the address on Exhibit 3P, the
PIainitiffs copy of the confirmation, was computer
generated and would show the same address as on the original
confirmation sent to the defendant. (Page 513). The
Defendant confirmed that the address on Exhibit 3P is her
address and had been at the time of the sale.

(Page 438).

The Defendant has denied receipt of this confirmation.
However, the unsupported denial of receipt by an addressee
ought to be received with the greatest amount of caution.
In Re Imperial Land Co. (1872) L.R. 15 Eq (Eng) 18.

Further

the court in Ren land v. First National Bank 90 Mont. 424, 4
P2d 488 (1931) stated that positive testimony of nonreceipt
does not overcome the presumption of delivery.

See also

Olsen v. Davidson, Supra, where the Court stated that mere
denial of receipt does not rise to the dignity of a bona
fide rebuttal of such presumption.

Similarly First National

Bank of Denver v. Henning 150 P2d 790.

Additionally, in

Wenger v. Success Manufacturing Co. 227 F2d 548 (1915) the
Court stated that denial of receipt does not overcome the
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presumption of receipt especially when the sendee actaitted
receiving previous notices sent to the same address.

The

Defendant in her testimony admits to having received
subsequent mailings from the Plaintiff (Page 438) which were
generated in the same manner* (Page 512).
The question that remains is whether the confirmation
was mailed.

The Court in Lieb v. Webster, Supra, stated the

where an office handles such a large volume of business that
no one could be expected to remember any particular notice
or letter, proof of mailing may be made by showing an office
custom with respect to the mailing and compliance with such
custom in the specific instance.

The testimony of Johonson,

Plaintiff's office manager, sets forth the office custom as
it relates to mailing business correspondence including
confirmations. (Page 507-14).

That testimony clearly

indicates a system was in place during the time of this sale
by the Defendant.

It clearly provides accurate addressing

and affixing of postage to each confirmation.

It clearly

shows he is responsible for the system and was personally
involved with the system. Further, Johnson testified that
while he didn't remember that specific confirmation he
specifically remembered handing the stack of confirmations
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to the clerk who posted the confirmations and he watched her
leave for the post box* (Page 521).
The Court in Tabor & Co. v. Gorinz 356 NE2nd 1150
(1976) reinterated that mailing could be established by
evidence of corroborative circumstances tending to establish
the fact that the custom had been followed in the particular
instance and stated that those corroborative circumstances
would include evidence that the confirmation forms were
created so that the correct sendees address would show on
the envelope, and that the senders return address was
imprinted on the envelope, that the sendee acta itted
receiving mailings made pursuant to the same business
practice close in time to the transactions in question and
that the disputed item had not been returned.

The Court

stated that this would be sufficient even in the absense of
the testimony of the clerk who would have mailed the
letters.
As the testimony sets forth in this case, the
confirmation of the sale was generated by computer with the
address on the envelope imprinted as on the confirmation and
as on the copy kept by the Plaintiff. (Page 513). The
Defendant acknowledged the address on the Plainitff/s copy
of the confirmation to be her address. (Page 438). Further,
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the Defendant admitted (Page 438) to having received other
documents which were mailed pursuant to the same procedure
at ot near the same time. (Page 512). And also, the
confirmation of sale which Defendant denies receiving was
never returned to the Plaintiff and if it had been returned
it would have been seggregated in a separate file.

Johnson

testified that he personally checked that file for return of
the sale confirmation and it was not in the file.

(Page

513).
In the case Pence Mortgage Co. v. Stokes 559 SW2d 500,
a mailing was sufficiently established if the above steps
were shown and if the copy of the notification which was
sent to he insurance agent was received by the agent.

The

Defendant's Agent, Babcock, testified he received his copy
of the notification of the sale (called a can buy). (Page
472 & 478).
The evidence clearly shows a mailing custom which was
adhered to in the instant case thus raising the presumption
of receipt and therefore the contract in enforceable.
The District Court in its Findings indicated tha the
Plaintiff should be estopped from collecting the amount due
to it since the Plaintiff waited to buy-in securities to
cover the sale and non-delivery in the Defendant's account.
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In the case Billings Associates v. Bashaw, NY Supreme Court
Appellate Division, January 19, 1967, 276 NYS 2d 446 (1967)
the Court stated that the failure of a broker to liquidate a
securities transaction until one month after the customer
failed to pay for the transaction was no bar to his action
against his customer for damages but the time period may
determine the amount of damages which the broker sustained.
In this action the Plaintiff did not buy-in the Defendants
account until November 30, 1984.

The testimony indicates

tha the Defendant after the sale indicated she would bring
in the certificate (Page 470); then that she had lost the
certificate (Page 471); and again later she called the
Plaintiff and said she had lost the certificate (Page 504)
and was given a date on which the buy-in would occur which
date was November 30, 1984. (Page 505). The Defendant's
conduct in stating that she would bring in the certificate
on several occasions should in fact work an estoppel of her
right to claim the sale should have been bought-in earlier.
Further, the Defendant at any time could have made a
purchase to close out the previous sale.

She never did so,

instead she continued to to say she would bring in the the
certificate.

The Defendant now claims that the Plaintiff

should have bought in her account after the first
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conversation with Davis a week or so after the sale because
she claims she told Davis she had changed her mind about the
sale. (Page 447). She was told she couldn't cancel the sale
and when she asked what to do she was told to contact her
broker, Babcock. (Page 448). She didn't contact her broker,
but when he contacted her, she didn't say to cancel the
sale, she said she would bring in the certificate. (Page
470).

The Plaintiff withheld buying-in the Defendant's

account based upon the Defendant's statements that she would
bring in the stock.

It is the Defendant and not the

Plaintiff who should be estopped from relief.
ARGUMENT NO. II - RULE 1QB-5
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE
10B-5.
The elements which must be shown in order to make a
finding of violation of Securities and Exchange Act Rule
10b-5 are as follows:
a) The person alleging the violation must be a
purchaser or seller.
b) There must be the use of a manipulative or deceptive
device as set forth in the statute itself.
c) Scienter must be plead and proved by the one
claiming a violation.

- 22 -

d) There must be actual damages.
A) Purchaser or Seller
The U.S. Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps et al. v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 (1975) confirmed the rule
enunicated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F2d 461
(1952) that a person who is neither a purchaser or a seller
may not bring an action under Section 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or the SEC's Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
The Court also ruled that since Congress had refused to
extend Section 10b to cover attempts to purchase or sell,
the Court would not extend the scope of the present statute
or rule thereunder.
The Defendant in this action has consistently claimed
and maintained that she was not a seller.

Therefore, by her

own admissions she has herself foreclosed the use of Section
10b and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
Additonally, since the Defendant retained her shares of
stock, she would not be a seller under the theory as set
forth in 0/Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago 1979 CCH Federal Securities Law
Reporter Dec. 96,780 wherein the Court stated that pension
trustees who entered discretionary trust or agency
agreements with a bank for investment of funds did not meet
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the purchaser-seller requirement with respect to securities
which were retained and ultimately sold.
Since the Defendant did not meet this element the 10b-5
claim must fal1.
B) Use of a Manipulative or Deceptive Device,
Rule 10b-5 itself requires some manipulative or
deceptive device.

The Defendant in her Amended

Counter-claim has claimed that the Plaintiff attempted
without authorization to convert and sell the Defendants
shares.

As set forth above, the evidence clearly shows that

the Defendant not only authorized the sale but requested it.
Further, the acts of the Defendant after the sale in
agreeing to bring in the certificate evidences her
willingness to enter into the transaction.

Since the

Defendants only claim is that the Plaintiff executed an
unauthorized sale, and since that sale was in fact
authorized, a further essential criteria for a violation of
Rule 10b-5 has not been met and the District Court's
decision must be reversed.
C> Scienter.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 US 185 (1976) the
Supreme Court stated that Scienter was an essential element
for a violation of Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
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Scienter was defined by the Court to be a mental state
embracing intent to deceive manipulate or defraud - an
intentional or wilful act*

The Defendant has only claimed

the alleged unauthorized sale as a violation of Rule 10b-5.
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated:
"The Court has learned to its frustration
during this trial that the Defendants testimony
is extremely difficult to follow, particularly
when she is excited. The Salt Lake Broker
interpreted the conversation to be a request for
a stock sale." (Page 276)
The District Court clearly found at most that there was
a good faith misunderstanding regarding the stock sale.
Thus there was no finding of intentional or wilful
misconduct relating to the sale and no finding of scienter
can stand relating to the sale and thus no violation of Rule
10b-5.
In additon, in facts similar to this case, the Ninth
Circuit in Brophy v. Redivo, et al. 1984 CCH Federal
Securities Law Reporter 99,676

stated:

"Ms. Brophy argues that Blyth, Eastman,
through Mr. Redivo, traded on her account without
authority and by doing so violated section 10b
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78j, and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Because we are
reviewing the granting of a directed verdict
for the defendants, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to plaintiff and therefore
assume that defendants'" August trades on Ms.
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Brophy / s account were unauthorized. We must
then answer a question previously unaddressed
by this court: Does unauthorized trading,
without more, constitute a violation of Rule
10b-5? We hold it does not." Cat 97,723).
In the case before the court, the Defendants only
allegations relating to the 10b-5 claim are unauthorized
trading.

Under the holding in the Brophy case no cause of

action lies pursuant to 10b-5.

Under the Brophy case and

the Ernst & Ernst case it is clear that the Defendant has
failed to meet her burden in proving scienter and thus the
District Court / s ruling must be reversed.
D. DAMAGES
A civil right of action pursuant to Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10
thereunder, requires as an element of the violation, some
injury or damages. James et al. v. Meinke 85-86 CCH Federal
Securities Law Reporter Dec. 92,417; Herman MacLean v.
Huddleston (Ca-5 1981) 1981 CCH Federal Securities Law
Reporter 97,919 640 F2d 534 (1981); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.
v. Penham (SDNY) 547 F Supp 1286; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F2d 461; Blue Chip Stamps vs. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). The District C o u r t s Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment show no injury to the Respondent.
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The District Court did not make an award of any actual,
general, nominal nor compensatory damages, nor was
Respondent granted any equitable relief.

Obviously an

essential element for a violation of 10b-5 was not found by
the District Court and therefore its decision must be
reversed.
ARGUMENT NO. Ill - RULE 10B-10
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE
10B-10.
The elements requsite for a showing of violation of
Rule 10b-10, since it was adopted pursuant to Section 10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as was Rule 10b-5, are
similar to those required for a showing of violation of Rule
10b-5.

Those elemnts include:

a) The person claiming the violation must be a
purchaser or seller.
b) Scienter must be alleged and shown.
c> There must be proof of violation of one of the
listed requirements in Rule lQb-10.
d) The person claiming the violation must show actual
damages.
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A) Purchaser or Seller and Damages
The elements that there be a Purchaser or Seller and
Damages are identical as set forth under Argument II.

Since

the Defendant has failed to prove these elements the
District Courts Decision must be reversed.
B) Scienter
As to the requirement of Scienter, the only evidence
was the testimony of Johnson that every effort was made to
send out a confirmation of the sale.

There are no

allegations of Scienter in Defendant's Amended Counter-Claim
and no findings of scienter in the District Court's ruling.
On this element alone the decision must be reversed.
C) Rule lOb-10 Listed Requirements
In order to sustain a finding of violation of Rule
10b-10, one of the reuirements enumerated in the rule must
be shown to have been violated. The District Court's only
Findings in regards to Rule 10b-10 was that the Plaintiff
failed to give notice of the sales transaction. (Page 289).
In its Conclusions the Court stated the Plaintiff had
violated Rule 10b-10 by failing to provide a notice in
writtlng of the sale transaction to the Defendant.

As set

forth in Argument No. I, the Plaintiff believes it has shown
that a notice was in fact given to the Defendant.
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However,

as to this element, the District Court clearly required the
burden of proof incorrectly.

The burden of proof in Section

10 actions is clearly on the one claiming a violation.
Herman MacLean v. Huddleston 640 F2d 534 C1981).

The

District Court in this action in its Memordandum Decision
stated "The Court concludes that the Plainitff has failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such a
notice was given.M (Page 277). Placing the burden on the
Plaintiff was erroneous and the Courts finding on this
element alone requies a reversal of the District Court's
decision.
The Defendant has failed to prove even one of the
elements necessary to sustain a violation of Rule 10b-10,
much less all of the required elements and therefore the
Court's decision must be reversed.
ARGUMENT NO. IV - NASD RULES
In order for the Defendant to prevail in an action for
violation of NASD Rules, she must show that she has a
private right of action to bring a suit pursuant to NASD
Rules.

In addition, the Defendant must prove and findings

must be entered regarding each of the elements of a
violation of those Rules.
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A> Private Right of Action.
The NASD, National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. is a private corporation which was organized pursuant
to authority given under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

The Corporation is not a government agency.

In order

for the Defendant to prevail on her allegations of violation
of any NASD rules she must show a private right to enforce
those rules and recover for losses occasioned thereunder.
The District Court never acknowledged that private right of
action nor were any Findings of such a right made; without
such Defendants cause of action must fail.
B) Elements for Violation
The Tenth Circuit while not granting a private right of
action for NASD violations, in dicta indicated that if a
Private Right of Action were to exist for violation of NASD
Rules then one of the requirements would be a showing of
scienter.

Utah State University v. Bear Stearns et al. 549

F2d 164 (1976) 10th Cir. The Defendant made no allegations
in her Amended Counter-Claim and the District Court made no
findings of Scienter as to any of the alleged violations of
NASD rules and therfore the allegations in this regard must
fail and the District's Court's decision in this regard must
be reversed.

The Tenth Circuit Court's reasoning as to
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whether a private right of action exists under NASD rules
parallels the U.S. Supreme Court / s reasoning in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hockfelder 425 US 185 (1976), wherein it granted a
private right of action in Section 10b cases.

It is

therefore appropriate that since the basis for a cause of
action under 10b requires that damages be proved and found
to exist, that similarly, damages are an essential element
for a private right of action for violation of NASD rules,
if such private right exists.
The District Court / s Findings, Conclusions and Judgment
show no injury to the Defendant.

The District Court did not

make an award of any actual, general, nominal nor
compensatory damages, nor was Defendant granted any
equitable relief.

Without a finding of actual damages, no

violation can exist and the District Court / s ruling must be
reversed.
C) Specific Requiremnts of the Alleged NASD Rules.
A review of each of the substantive portions of the
NASD rules must be made and violation must be shown for
there to be a violation.
Section 12.
Section 12 requires the delivery of a confirmation and
specifies the information the confirmation must contain.
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No

findings were made that the confirmation, Exhibit 3Pf did
not contain the required information*

The issue of whether

the confirmation was delivered has been discussed previously
in detail in the Arguments above and specifically in
Argument III relating to Rule 10b-10.

Since the elements

were not shown, the District Court's decision in this matter
must be reversed.
Section 18.
This section closely parallels the prohibitions of Rule
10b-5 and were discussed in detail in Argument No. II above.
Since the allegations were not sustained nor proven as set
forth above in Argument II, the decision of violation under
this Rule must also be reversed.
Section 21<a8cb)
This section requires that the books and records of the
Plaintiff must be kept as set forth therein and that certain
information must be kept by the Plaintiff regarding its
customers.

There is no evidence nor findings that the

Plaintiff's books and records were kept other than as set
forth in the rule and thus the ruling of violation of this
section must be reversed.
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Paragraphs 2761 and Paragraph 2162 Sections 1 and 9.
There is no paragraph 2761 in the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, nor are there Section 1 and 9 in paragraph 2162 of
the Rules of Fair Practice and therefore the decision as to
these must be reversed.
ARGUMENT NO. V - PUNITIVE DAMAGES
An award of punitive damages can only be upheld if
there is some proper basis upon which that award can rely.
It is well settled law that recovery pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is limited to actual loss as
mandated by Section 28(a) of the Act and that an award of
punitive damages is not allowed pursuant to a private right
of action for violation of Section 10 and Rules promulgated
thereunder. Green v. Wolf Corp. 406 F2d 291 (1968);
Richardson v. MacArthur 451 F2d 35 (1971); Vogel v. Trahan
(ED Pa Jan 11, 1980) 79-80 CCH Federal Securities Law
Reporter Dec 92,321; Jones v. Miles 81-82 CCH Federal
Securities Law Reporter Dec 98,276 (Ca-5 1981); de Haas v.
Empire Petroleum Company 435 F2d 1223 (1970).

The Court in

Green v. Wolf Corp. Supra, at page 302 stated that Section
28(a) limited recovery in private suits pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to actual damages.

This was

adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Richardson v. MacArthur,
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Supra, at page 45 wherein the Court stated that Section
28(a) limited "recovery in private suits for damages to
Actual damages4'."

Since the NASD itself and all rules

promulgated thereunder have effect pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 15A, only actual
damages would be allowed and punitive damages specifically
not permitted.

Thus the award of punitive damages was error

and should therefore be reversed.
On a separate theory, punitive damages would not be
available to Defendant in this matter in that this Court in
Cohn vs. J.C. Penney 537 P2d 306, at page 311, held that
special damages must be plead in order to be awarded unless
the "pleadings contain such information as will apprise the
defendant of such damages as must of necessity flow from
that which is alleged."

The necessity for pleading punitive

damages should require no less, since this Court has found
that an award of punitive "constitutes an extraordinary
remedy outside the field of usual redressful remedies..."
First Security Bank of Utah v. JBJ Feedyards, Inc. 653 P2d
591 (1982).

Since as shown above, punitive damages are not

allowable pursuant to 10b-5, 10b-10 and NASD rules, and
since these are the only claims for relief plead by the
Defendant, these violations plead by the Defendant fail to
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contain such information as would appraise the Plaintiff of
the necessity to defend relative to punitive damages.
Without having requested punitive damages nor having plead
sufficient information so as to appraise Plaintiff regarding
the need to defend against such damages, an award of
punitive damages was error and should be reversed*
The award of punitive damages must also be reversed
alternatively on another basis in that this Court has
consistently held that there must be some relationship
between actual damages and an award of punitive damages,
First Security Bank v. JBJ Feedyards, Inc. Supra; Bundy v.
Century 692 P2d 754 (1984); Cruz v. Montoya 660 P2d 723
(Utah 1983); or there must be at least some grant of
equitable relief.

Nash v. Craigco 585 P2d 775 (1978).

In

this case, the District court did not find nor award any
actual, compensatory, nominal damages nor grant any
equitable relief.

Defendant may content that equitable

relief was granted wherein the Court ruled that she was the
sole owner of her shares of stock and that the Plaintiff had
no ownership interest therein.

In fact, however, no such

relief was granted since Plaintiff had never claimed any
ownership of Defendants stock and was only claiming that
Defendant owed to Plaintiff a sum of money.
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While the Court

had properly granted a Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment to
ensure funds were available in the event Plaintiff was
sucessful on its claim, the elimination of the Writ of
Attachment was not a grant of equitable relief but merely
the logical result of a finding that Plaintiff had not
proved its case and was not entitled to relief*

Therefore,

since no damages were granted to the Defendant, no grant of
punitive damages is sustainable and the entry of such an
award was error and must be reversed.
ARGUMENT NO. VI - MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS
The Court entered various Findings which were not
alleged by the Plaintiff or the Defendant and which are not
sustainable by the facts and law.

Each Findings is treated

separately.
A SECURITY CANNOT BE SOLD WITHOUT THE POSSESSION OF A
CERTIFICATE
The District Court ruled that a sale of securities
cannot take place without the presence of the stock
certificate.

Common usage and knowledge reflects that sales

of securities are made common place without the certificate
in possession.

Short sales, or sales made in anticipation

of a drop in price wherein the seller can purchase the
shares at a lower price to cover the previous sale are
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commonplace and executed daily.

The District Courts

findings should be reversed.
THE PLAINTIFF PURCHASED THE DEFENDANT STOCK TO PREVENT
PROFIT TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT.
The evidence as set forth above is that the defendant
contacted the Plaintiff in order to sell her shares.

There

is no evidence that the Plaintiff ever had any means of
obtaining Defendant's certificate and thereby preventing her
later sale and profit.

The District Court's Finding must be

reversed.
THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS
IMPROPER OR ILLEGAL.
The District Court's finding that the commission on the
sale of the defendant's shares was small and that therefore
there must have been some other reason for the sale is not
supported by the facts.

The Defendant's sale was of over

*3 f 000 and the commission would therefore be several hundred
dollars.

The amount of money for the work necessary was not

disporportionate to trades in the Salt Lake Market.

There

is no evidence that the purchase of the shares would result
in any improper or illegal use of the shares.
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THAT THE REASON THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVED HER SHARE
CERTIFICATE FROM THE TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME
ALLEGED SCHEME.
There is no evidence that the Plaintiff had any control
over the Transfer Agent or could in any manner restrict the
delivery of the Defendants certificate.

The District

C o u r t s Finding in this matter is without basis and must be
reversed.
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE
TRANSACTIONS WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION.
The Plaintiff's account card (Exhibit IP) requires the
customer to complete their transactions by the fifth
business day.

However, the Account Card specifically allows

the Plaintiff the option of allowing a transaction to remain
open or to close the transaction at their discretion.

The

wording on the Account Card is plain and the Court's
interpretation otherwise is error and must be reversed.
THAT A CONVERSION OF THE DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED.
The Court's Findings in paragraph 7, and Conclusions in
paragraphs 1 and 5 indicate that the Defendant's shares
where converted.

In fact, as set forth above, the Issuer of

the shares owned by the Defendant changed its name and
effected a reverse stock split.
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The changing of a corporate

name and stock split is not a conversion of securities and
the C o u r t s Findings and Conclusion must be reversed.
THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF
HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER VENTURE CONSOLIDATED.
The Court / s Judgment indicates that the Plaintiff had
an involvment and hold and control over Venture
Consolidated.

There is no evidence that the Plaintiff ever

had sufficient stock to control or maintain a hold over
Venture Consolidated.

In fact the only testimony is by

Johnson and is that the Plaintiff never had such hold or
control by way of stock ownership. (Page 518). There is no
evidence of any other type of hold or control which
Plaintiff was alleged to have had.

Further, there is no

evidence that the Plaintiff was in possession of any
information which could be considered "inside information".
The only information about Venture Consolidated was that
information which was found in Exhibit 2P which the
Defendant acfrnitted to having received prior to the sale and
at the approximately time it was distributed to shareholders
generally. (Page 400-1).
THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED.
The District C o u r t s Conclusions and Judgment indicate
that the Plaintiff acted in such a manner so as to deceive
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and cheat the public in general.

There is no evidence that

the general public was ever cheated in any manner and in any
way by the Plaintiff.

This should be reversed.
CONCLUSION

The facts and evidence before this Court require a
reversal of the District Court's decision and the entry of a
Judgment against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiff in
the amount of *5404.20 plus interest from the date of the
sale transaction, attorneys fees and costs.

Further that

the decision as to violations by the Plaintiff of Rules
10b-5, 10b-10 and NASD Rules must be reversed.

The entry of

a Judgment in favor of the Defendant for punitive damages
was improper and must be reversed.

The various

miscellaneous Findings and Conclusions and Judgments as set
forth above must be reversed.
Dated this 18th day of May, 1987.

CraigkT. McCu though—• : ° — ~
Attorney" for Plaintiff-Appellant
185 South State Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0378
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May, 1987, I deposited
postage prepaid in the United States Mail, a copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant addressed to Gerald S. Wight, Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden
Utah 84401.
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
Memorandum Decision

1 6, 6 1 9 - 2

Exchange Act—Manipulations

[fl 22,729k]

Confirmation of Transactions

i^—>- Rule 10b-10 is amended. See below.
Reg. §240.10b-10. (a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to
effect for or with the account of a customer any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale by such customer of, any security (other than U.S. Savings Bonds or municipal securities) unless such broker or dealer, at or
before completion of such transaction, gives or sends to such customer written notification disclosing
(1) Whether he is acting as agent for such customer, as agent for some
other person, as agent for both such customer and some other person, or as
principal for his own account; and
(2) The date and time of the transaction (or the fact that the time of
the transaction will be furnished upon written request of such customer) and
the identity, price and number of shares or units (or principal amount) of
such .security purchased or sold by such customer; and
(3) In the case of any transaction in a debt security subject to redemption before maturity, a statement to the effect that such debt security may
be redeemed in whole or in part before maturity, that such a redemption
could affect the yield represented and that additional information is available
upon request; and [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (TJ83,341), April 18,
1983, effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.]
(4) In the case of a transaction in a debt security effected exclusively
on the basis of a dollar price
(i) The dollar price at which the transaction was effected, and
(ii) The yield to maturity calculated from the dollar price; Provided,
however, that this paragraph (ii) shall not apply to a transaction in a debt
security with a maturity date that may be extended by the issuer thereof,
with a variable interest rate payable thereon, or a participation interest
in notes secured by liens upon real estate continuouslv subject to prepayment; and [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), April 18, 1983,
effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.]
(5) In the case of a transaction in a debt security effected on the basis
of yield
(i) The yield at which the transaction was effected, including the
percentage amount and its characterization (e.g., current yield, yield to
maturity, or yield to call) and if effected at yield to call, the type of call,
the call date and call price;
(ii) The dollar price calculated from the yield at which the transaction
was effected; and
(iii) If effected on a basis other than yield to maturity and the yield
to maturity is lower than the represented yield, the yield to maturity as
well as the represented yield; Provided, however, that this paragraph (iii)
shall not apply to a transaction in a debt security with a maturity date
that may be extended by the issuer thereof, with a variable interest rate
payable thereon, or a participation interest in notes secured by liens upon
real estate continuously subject to preoavment; and [Adopted in Release
No. 34-19687 (<[ 83,341), April 18, 1983, effective January 1, 1984* 48 F. R. 17583.]
(6) Whether any odd-lot differential or equivalent fee has been paid by
such customer in connection with the execution of an order for an odd-lot
number of shares or units for principal amount) of a security and that
the amount of any such differential or fee will be furnished upon oral or
H 22,729A

Reg. § 2 4 0 . 1 Ob-10
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written request; Provided, however, That such disclosure need not be made
if the differential or fee is included in the remuneration disclosed, or exempted
from disclosure, pursuant to paragraph (a)(7)(H) ; and [Amended in Release
No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.]
(7) If he is acting as agent for such customer, for some other person,
or for both such customer and some other person,
(i) The name of the person from whom th« security was purchased, or
to whom it was sold, for such customer or the fact that such information
will be furnished upon written request of such customer; and
(ii) The amount of any remuneration received or to be received by him
from such customer in connection with the transaction unless remuneration
paid by such customer is determined, pursuant to a written agreement with
such customer, otherwise than on a transaction basis; and
(iii) The source and amount of any other remuneration received or to
be received by him in connection with the transaction; Provided, however,
That if, in the case of a purchase, the broker was not participating in a
distribution, or in the case of a sale, was not participating in a tender offer,
the written notification may state whether any other remuneration has been
or will be received and that the source and amount of such other remuneration will be furnished upon written request of such customer; and
(8) If he is acting as principal for his own account
^ - > Rule 10b-10(a)(8)(i) is amended. See below.
(i) The amount of any mark-up, mark-down, or similar remuneration
received in a transaction in an equity security if he is not a market makei
in that security and if, after having received an order to buy from sue!
customer, he purchased the security from another person to offset a con
temporaneous sale to such customer or, after having received an order t<
sell from such customer, he sold the security to another person to offset ;
contemporaneous purchase from such customer; and
•>B ••> Reproduced below is the text of Rule 10b-10(a)(8)(i) as amended
in Release No. 34-22397 ffl 83\912), effective March 17, 1986.
(i)(A) If he is not a market maker in that security and, if, afte
having received an order to buy from such customer, he purchased th
security from another person to offset a contemporaneous sale to such cus
tomer or, after having received an order to sell from such customer, h
sold the security to another person to offset a contemporaneous purchas
from such a customer, the amount of any mark-up, mark-down, or simila
remuneration received in an equity security; or
(B) In any other case of a transaction in a reported security, th
trade price reported in accordance with an effective transaction reportin
plan, the price to the customer in the transaction, and the difference,
anv, between the reported trade price and the price to the customer. [Amende
in'Release No. 34-22397 (fl 83,912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.]
(ii) In the case of a transaction in an equity security, whether he is
market maker in that security (otherwise than by reason of his acting as
block positioner in that security).
(b) A broker or dealer may effect transactions for or with the accoui
of a customer without giving or sending to such customer the writte
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section if
(1) Such transactions are effected pursuant to a periodic plan or s
investment company plan; and
Federal Securities Law Reports
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(2) Such broker or dealer gives or sends to such customer within five business days after the end of each quarterly period a written'statement disclosing
each purchase or sale, effected for or with, and each dividend or distribution
credited to, or reinvested for, the account of such customer (pursuant to the
plan) during the period; the date of each such transaction; the identity,
number and price of any securities purchased or sold by such customer in
each such transaction; the total number of shares of such securities in such
customer's account; any remuneration received or to be received by the
broker or dealer in connection therewith; and that any other information
required by paragraph (a) will be furnished upon written request; Provided,
however, That the quarterly written statement may be delivered to some other
person designated by the customer for distribution to the customer; and
[Amended in Release No. 34-19687 (ft 83,341), effective July 25, 1983, 48 F. R.
17583.]
(3) In the case of transactions effected pursuant to an investment company plan
(i) Payments for the purchase of securities by such customer or by such
customer's designated agent are made directly to, or made payable to, the
registered investment company, or the principal underwriter, custodian,
trustee, or other designated agent of the registered investment company; and
(ii) The intention to give or send to the customer the written statement
referred to in subparagraph (b)(2) of this paragraph, in lieu of the written
notification required by paragraph (a), is disclosed in writing to such customer.
(c) A broker or dealer may effect transactions for or with the account
of a customer without giving or sending to such customer the written
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section if
(1) Such transactions are effected in shares of any no-load open-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
that attempts to maintain a constant net asset value per share and that holds
itself out to be a "money market" fund or has an investment policy calling
for investment of at least 80% of its assets in debt securities maturing in
thirteen months or less; and
(2) Such broker or dealer gives or sends to such customer within five
business days after the end of each monthly period a written statement
disclosing each purchase or redemption, effected for or with, and each dividend or distribution credited to, or reinvested for, the account of such
customer during the month; the date of each such transaction; the identity,
number and price of any securities purchased or redeemed by such customer
in each such transaction: the total number of shares of such securities in
such customer's account; any remuneration received or to be received by
the broker or dealer in connection therewith ; and that any other information required by paragraph (a) will be furnished upon written request; and
(3) Such customer is provided with prior notification in writing disclosing the intention to send the written information referred to in paragraph
(c)(1) on a monthly basis in lieu of an immediate confirmation.
[Paragraph (c) as adopted in Release No. 34-196S7 (fl 83,341 \ effective
July 25, 1983, 48 F. R. 17583.]
(d) A broker or dealer shall °-ive or send to a customer information
requested pursuant to this rule within five business days of receipt of the
request; Provided, however, That in the case of information pertaining to a
fl 2 2 , 7 2 9 A
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transaction effected more than 30 days prior to receipt of the request, the
information shall be given or sent to the customer within 15 business days.
(e) For the purposes of this rule,
(1) "Customer" shall not include a broker or dealer;
(2) "Completion of the transaction" shall have the meaning provided
in Rule 15cl-l under the Act;
(3) "Time of the transaction" means the time of execution, to the extent
feasible, of the customer's order;
(4) "Debt security" as used in paragraph ( a ) ( 3 ) , ( a ) ( 4 ) , and (a)(5)
only, means any security, such as a bond, debenture, note, or any other
similar instrument which evidences a liability of the issuer (including any
such security that is convertible into stock or a similar security) and fractional or participation interests in one or more of any of the foregoing;
Provided, however, that securities issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 shall not be included in
this definition; [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (fl83,341), April 18, 1983,
effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.]
(5) "Periodic plan" means any written authorization for a broker acting
as agent to purchase or sell for a customer a specific security or securities
(other than securities issued by an open end investment company or unit
investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940), in
specific amounts (calculated in security units or dollars), at specific time
intervals and setting forth the commissions or charges to be paid by the
customer in connection therewith (or the manner of calculating t h e m ) ; and
(6) "Investment company plan" means any plan under which securities
issued by an open-end investment company or unit investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are purchased or sold by
a customer pursuant to
(i) An individual retirement or individual pension plan qualified under
the Internal Revenue Code; or
(ii) A contractual or systematic agreement under which the customer
purchases at the applicable public offering price, or redeems at the applicable
redemption price, such securities in specified amounts (calculated in security
units or dollars) at specified time intervals and setting forth the commissions
or charges to be paid by such customer in connection therewith (or the
manner of calculating t h e m ) ; or
(iii) Any other arrangement involving a group of two or more customers and contemplating periodic purchases of such securities by each
customer through a person designated by the group; Provided, That such
arrangement requires the registered investment company or its agent
(A) To give or send to the designated person, at or before the completion of the transaction for the purchase of such securities, a written
notification of the receipt of the total amount paid by the group;
(B) To send to anyone in the group who was a customer in the prior
quarter and on whose behalf payment has not been received in the current
quarter a quarterly written statement reflecting that a payment was not
received on his behalf; and
(C) To advise each customer in the group if a pavment is not received
from the designated person on behalf of the group within 10 days of a date
certain specified in the arrangement for delivery of that payment by the
Federal Securities Law Reports
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designated person and thereafter to send to each such customer the written
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section for the next three
succeeding payments.
i)B > Reproduced below is the text of Rule 10b-10(e)(7) and (8) as added
ID Release No. 34-22397 (fl 83,912), effective March 17, 1986.
(7) "Reported security" shall have the meaning provided in Rule
HAa3-l under the Act. [Added in Release No. 34-22397 (If 83,912), effective
March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.]
(8) "Effective transaction reporting plan" shall have the meaning provided in Rule l l A a 3 - l under the Act. [Added in Release No. 34-22397 (jl 83,912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.]
(f) The Commission may exempt any broker or dealer from the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section with regard to specific transactions or specific classes of transactions for which the broker or dealer
will provide alternative procedures to effect the purposes of this section;
any such exemption may be granted subject to compliance with such alternative procedures and upon such other stated terms and conditions as the
Commission may impose.
[Adopted in Release No. 34-13508 (fl 81,143), effective January 1, 1978,
with the exception of paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e), which are effective
June 1. 1977, 42 F. R. 25323; amended in Release No. 34-14184 (fl 81,367), effective date postponed until April 1, 1978, 42 F. R. 60734; Release No. 3414573 (5181,536), effective date postponed until August 1, 1978, 43 F. R.
11981: Release No. 34-14942 (ft81,638), effective date postponed until December 18, 1978, 43 F. R. 30271; Release No. 34-11219 (1181,746), effective
December 18, 19.78, 43 F. R. 47503; Release No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), April
18, 1983. effective July 25, 1983 and January 1, 1984, 48 F. 'R. \7SS3; and
Release No. 34-22397 fl[ 83,912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.]
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GERALD S. WIGHT, #3461
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vsHELEN KNUDSVIG,

CIVIL NO: 92290

Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court for trial on
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m.,
Plaintiff being present in Court and represented by Attorney
Craig McCullough, and Defendant being present in Court and
represented by her attorney, Gerald S. Wight, and the Court
having taken the matter under advisement and subsequently
issued its Memorandum Decision, does hereby make the following Findings of Fact in accordance with that Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Defendant

is a 61-year

old

lady who has

habitually dabbled in penny stocks usually in the amount of

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

2 86

a few hundred dollars or less, investing in new issues which
will hopefully achieve a quick rise in value.

Plaintiff

attempted to establish that the Defendant was an experienced
and sophisticated investor but this is contrary to the facts
that were brought out at trial,
2.

In 1984 Defendant bought some $200.00 worth of

penny stocks in a company known as Venture Consolidated
which at that time amount to 20,000 shares.

The particular

stock was a new issue and a typical penny stock offering and
the Plaintiff corporation was the market maker of the issue
and the market which would follow.
million

The plan was to sell 100

(100,000,000) shares, or $1,000,000.00 worth and

eventually insiders captured 23% of the 200,000 plus shares
sold while the public holding was to be at $200,000.00. The
investment was principally held in cash in a plan developed
wherein a shareholders meeting would be called to bring
about a merger and consolidation with several other corporations with the resulting entity to be known as Tires,
Inc., with a 20 to 1 reverse
immediately

thereafter.

This

stock

split taking place

particular

shareholders

meeting was to occur on September 19, 1984.

In the mean-

time, the Venture Consolidated stock rose from one cent (1C)
to sixteen (16C) or seventeen (17C) cents, the sole reason
for the rise apparently being the proposed merger and the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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general market making activities of the Plaintiff brokerage.
Due

to

the

activities

of

Plaintiff

and

other

involved

parties, the result of their activities was to raise the
value of Venture Consolidated and eventually the Tires, Inc.
stocks.

This

has

resulted

in

the

Defendant's

original

$200.00 investment being worth approximately $30,000.00 at
the time of trial which is primarily based upon the general
market making activities of the Plaintiff brokerage and/or
other insiders activity.
3.

That the Plaintiff has at all time maintained an

Ogden office with the account executive for that office, Lou
Babcock, being well acquainted with the Defendant.

That Mr.

Babcock visited with the Defendant on September 14, 1984,
and advised her of the stocks climb in value and offered to
sell it for her.

Such a sale would bring on the recording

of an additional indication of a fixed value for the market
making activity, and would serve also to pick up the stock
in the face of what appeared to be high promotional activity
in order to prevent profit taking before the explosion in
value was to occur.

That while the motive to sell the

stocks on commission was no doubt present, the Court does
find that any such commission would be very small.

That the

Defendant became excited about the potential rise in value
and decided to obtain a second opinion by placing a call to

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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the Salt Lake office and requesting further information*
That

the

broker

who

received

the

call

interpreted

the

conversation to be a request for a sale of her shares and he
then

contacted

the

vice-president

of

the brokerage

for

further instructions on what to do in as much as he knew
that there was no stock
brokerage.

That

in

certificate with

spite

of

this

the Plaintiff

difficulty,

the

vice-present of the brokerage immediately approved the sale
and the brokerage then made an entry that the purchase was
made for their market making account.

That the Plaintiff

failed to give notice of the transaction as required by its
own agreement with the Defendant and by Federal and Association Rules and Regulations.
5.

That the Defendant had no intention of making a

sale of her shares and was aware of the fact that such a
sale could not take place without the presence of a stock
certificate and had in the past had such a sale cancelled as
opposed to having a purchase made by the broker to cover
what is known as a "short sale".

That one of the reasons

that the Defendant has never received a stock certificate is
that it would serve the personal interest of the insiders'
market making activity to freeze the outsiders and prevent
their profit taking and interference with the stock's rise
by making it more difficult for them to "profit take".

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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6.

That regulations and the broker's contract itself

with the Defendant, require a wind up and closing of all
transactions within five (5) days after a sale or purchase
occurs.

That the Plaintiff brokerage made no effort to

close in the five

(5) day period and that they in fact

preferred not to do so, preferring instead to await further
developments.

That the stock rose uniformly during the next

period of time and there was never any drop below the sales
price so that the brokerage position would be threatened.
That after approximately seventy-five (75) days, the Plaintiff decided to make a transfer purporting to cover the
short, making an entry that they had bought from their own
profit

making

account.

That

this

resulted

in

a paper

calculation that if the sale was made in accordance with the
original sales entry, and a short coverage was effected at
the

repurchase

date,

that

the

Defendant

would

owe

the

$5,400.00 claimed in Plaintiff's Complaint because of the
rise in the market during the seventy-five
Plaintiff's dalliance.

(75) days of

That the Plaintiff

would not be closing within five

knew that it

(5) days, even assuming

that the original sale had actually taken place and let the
matter

ride

at

the Defendant's

risk

and

should

estopped to make any claim against the Defendant.
Plaintiff

brokerage

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

has

suffered

no damage

now be
That the

in that the

2
5

entries made were strictly to and from their own market
making accounts and records and there is no evidence to
establish that they were ever in any way threatened in their
position.

That Defendant's shares could not be sold without

possession of the certificate.
7.

That the Defendant is the rightful owner of the

20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated which has subsequently
been converted to lr000 shares of Tires, Inc.f free and
clear of any and all claims of the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
does hereby arrive at the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

That the Plaintiff has failed to establish any

cause of action against this Defendant and has wrongfully
attempted to sell her 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated,
which has since been converted to 1,000 shares of Tires,
Inc.
2.

That said sale was in violation of Rule 10B(10)

and 10B(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that
Western Capital and Securities, Inc., attempted to unlawfully convert the shares of Venture Consolidated held by the
Defendant and by means and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce

or the mails or

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

any

facility

of any

national

O

6

fj

securities

exchange,

employed

a

scheme

and

made

untrue

statements of material fact, or failed to admit a material
fact and have engaged in a course of practice which operates
to defraud the Defendant in that they attempted without any
authorization whatsoever to convert and sell the securities
of the Defendant.

its

3.

That the Plaintiff further acted in violation of

own

agreement

with

the

Defendant

which

required

a

settling of all accounts within five (5) business days of
the transactions, and also Rule 10B(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to finalize said transaction
and further to provide a notice in writing of the same to
the Defendant as required by Rule 10B(10) and its own agreement.
4.
and

That in addition, the actions of Western Capital

Securities,

Inc.,

are

in

direct

violation

and

in

contravention of the NASB Manual Rules of Fair Practice,
Paragraph

2162, Sections

12, 18, 21(a) (b),

and

2761 in

addition to Sections 1 and 9 of the Paragraph 2162.
5.

That the Defendant is the sole and rightful owner

of the 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated which have
subsequently been converted to 1,000 shares of Tires, Inc.,
and said ownership is free and clear of any claims of any
kind of the Plaintiff, Western Capital and Securities.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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6.

That the activity of the Plaintiff in this matter

is unconscionable and done with the intent to make a profit
on the stocks generally held in the market making account
with the risk of loss solely that of the Defendants if there
should be any lapse in the rise of the stock's value.

That

the Plaintiff is a relatively large brokerage business which
has branch offices, makes prices and invests for its own
purposes, etc.

That persons in the position of the Defen-

dant are vulnerable to the behind-the-scenes activities of
entities such as the Plaintiff, and particularly

in the

penny stock market which attracts persons who might otherwise not be able to afford any losses.

That these people

cannot normally afford the costs and expenses involved in
litigation if treated unfairly or illegally.
7.

THat the deliberate failure to move towards the

closing of a transaction, together with the motive of the
Plaintiff to hold the stock at the Defendant's expense for a
period of seventy-five

(75) days, far in excess of the

mandatory five (5) day maximum, directly resulted in a cheat
of

the

stock

buying

public

and

more

particularly

this

Defendant, both of which are near helpless in situations
such as this.
8.

That based upon the size of the transaction, the

freezing of the stock that eventually reached a high value
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of $30,000.00, and the assertions of an unconscionable right
to hold the stock at investor's risk justifies the award of
punitive damages in the amount of^ $10,000.00.
1986.

DATED th

BY THE COURT:
/

s
-flOHN F.7WAHLQUIST
F./WAHLQUIST
HONORABLE^OHN"
District Court Jiddge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

? 0

day of October,

1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by placing
same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the
following:

Craig F. McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, #528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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GERALD S. WIGHT, #3461
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
-vsHELEN KNUDSVIG,

CIVIL NO: 92290

Defendant,
This matter having come before the Court for trial on
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close
of

testimony

and

oral

argument,

and

having

previously

rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as
follows:
1.

That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed

no cause of action.
2.
shares

JUDGMENT

That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 20
of

Venture

Consolidated

1

which

has

since^'
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converted by the company to 1,000 shares of Tires, Inc., and
has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or
against the Defendant.
3.

That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule

10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its
involvement and hold and control over the subject corporation with the knowledge and inside information of its
dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all
such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in attempting

to convert her stock, all in violation of all

applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defendant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in
the amount of $3^.00.
4.

It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or

any other entity which has previously been served with or
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant
upon appropriate application.

JUDGMENT

2

2

Recorded BookJlCiY,

Pe^e .1.4**) 3-..
Indexed

DATED this ft'

day of <?6t£beP, 1986.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

^0

day of October,

1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage
prepaid and addressed to the following:

Craig F. McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, #528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COU
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
HELEN KNUDSVIG,
Case No.

92290

Defendant.

The

Court

has

considered

exhibits, and the implications

drawn

the

testimony,

therefrom.

and

the

The defense

attorney is invited to submit findings of fact and conclusions of
law consistent with that indicated below.
FACTS
1.

The defendant

is a 61-year

habitually bought penny stocks.
a few hundred dollars.

old lady.

She has

This is usually in the amount of

She is most interested in new issues that

will hopefully make a quick rise, even though they may descend
later.
2.

The plaintiff's witnesses have claimed

that the

defendant was granted concessions because she was an established
good investor.

This is not real.

She testified that she bought

or traded a few hundred dollars per year.
refuted.

Her testimony is not

Her stock speculation in the face of financial problems

brings forth an image of a chronic desperate gambler.

O^4
& i4
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3.
Consolidated

In 1985 she bought

$200 worth

(20f000

This

shares).

typical penny stock offering.

of one cent Venture

was

a

new

issue,

and a

The plaintiff corporation was the

"market maker" of the issue and the market to follow.

The plan

was

Insiders

to

sell

captured
holding

100,000,000

23%
was

principally

of

the

200,000

reported
held

shares

in

to

be

cash.

($1,000,000

plus
at
A

shares

soldr

$200,000.
plan

worth).
and

The

developed

the

public

investment

wherein

a

was

share-

holders meeting was to be called to bring about a stock transfer
with Tires, Inc.r at a 20 to 1 reverse split.
on October 19, 1986.

This was to occur

In the meantime, the Venture Consolidated

stock rose from one cent to sixteen or seventeen cents.

There is

no evidence as to why the stock value rose, except the proposed
merger

and

brokerage.
adjoining

the

general

There

is

property"

market

nothing

making
like

in evidence.

activities

"discovery

The bottom

of

of
line

plaintiff

oil

on

the

seems to be

that a cash injection of something like $200,000 was to raise the
value of a Venture Consolidated to many times the invested value
and to further raise the Tire, Inc., stocks.

The result was that

this $200 investment has a market value of in the neigh- borhood
of $30,000 at trial time.
this

rise

except

the

The evidence offers no explanation for

general

market

making

activities

of

the

plaintiff brokerage and/or other "insiders1 activity".

J 4 t
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4.

The plaintiff maintains an Ogden office.

The Ogden

representative was well acquainted with the defendant.

He called

on her place of business on about September 13 or 14, 1985.

His

purpose was to tell her of the stock's climb and to offer to sell
it for her.
additional

Such a sell would bring on the recording of an

indication

of a fixed value for

the market making

activity, and would serve also to pick up the stock in the face
of what appeared to be high promotional activity in order to
prevent

profit

taking

before

the

explosion

in

value

was

to

occur.

While the motive to sell the stocks on commission is no

doubt present, the Court notes that such commission would be very
small.
5.

The defendant was excited.

"second opinion".

She decided to get a

After the Ogden office closed, she phoned the

Salt Lake office and pumped for further information.

The Court

has learned to its frustration during this trial that the defendant's testimony is extremely difficult to follow, particularly
so when she is excited.

The Salt Lake broker interpreted the

conversation to be a request for stock sale.

He contacted the

vice-president of the brokerage for further instructions on what
to do inasmuch as he knew that there was no stock certificate
with the plaintiff brokerage.

In spite of this difficulty, the

vice-president of the brokerage immediately approved the sale.
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The brokerage then made an entry that the purchase was made for
their market making account.

The question of whether or not a

notice of this transaction was mailed out or not is in conflict.
The Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that such a notice was given.
6.

The defendant interpreted the telephone conversation

in another direction.

She had in the past experienced efforts to

make sales when she did not have a stock certificate and had been
faced with canceled sales as opposed to purchases by the broker
to cover what is called "shorts".

She assumed that there would

be no final sale until she was able to get a stock certificate.
The Court has considered the conflicting evidence as to whether
or not a stock certificate was actually sent to her or not, and
has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is that it
was not sent.

This finding is not only based upon the defen-

dants testimony, but also the implication that it would serve
the personal interests of the insiders1 market making activity to
freeze the "outsiders" and prevent their profit taking and interference with the stock1 s rise by making it more difficult for
them to "profit take".
7.

Regulations and the. broker's contract both require a

wind up and close of all transactions within five days after a
sale or purchase occurs.

The plaintiff brokerage made no effort

Page 5
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to close in the five-day period.
did await developments.
period of time.

They preferred not to do so and

The stock rose uniformly during the next

There was never a drop below the sales price, so

that the brokerage would be threatened.
days, the plaintiff
cover the "short".

decided

After approximately 75

to make a transfer

purporting to

They made an entry that they had bought from

their profit-making account.

The result is that a paper calcula-

tion that if the sale was made in accordance with the original
sales entryr and a short coverage was effected at the repurchase
datef

that

the

defendant

would

owe

the

$5,000 plus dollars,

because of the rise in the market during those 75 days.

The

Court rejects this theory in that the plaintiff knew they were
not closing within 5 days, even if you assume that the original
sale was made, and let the matter ride at the defendant's risk,
and should now be estopped to make such claims.

The Court finds

that the brokerage suffered no damages in that the entries made
were strictly

from their market making records.

There is no

evidence that they were ever in any way threatened, she could not
sell without the stock.
8.

The Court finds that the defendant continues to be

the owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated and/or the
stock by whatever name it now is known.
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DAMAGES
The Court considers that the alleged sale never occurred
pursuant to the contract.

The Court does, however, find that the

plaintiff1s activity in this instance is unconscionable.

It knew

early that the defendant had denied the original sale had been
made, but nevertheless the brokerage took no action to close the
transaction within the five days.
ambiguous state.

It left the situation in an

Its intent was that they could make a profit on

the stocks generally held in the market making account with the
risk only to the defendant because of the stock's rise in value
was

consistent.

The

Court

is mindful

that

the

evidence in

general discloses a relatively large brokerage business which has
branch offices, makes prices, invests for its own purposes, etc.
The Court is also mindful of the vulnerability of persons in the
defendants position.

It is obvious that the penny market stock

market is one that attracts persons that might otherwise be in
the lottery ticket person class.

Their purchases are generally

sufficiently small that they cannot afford litigation if treated
unfairly.

The deliberate failure to move towards the closing of

a transaction, even if they were correct that a sale occurred and
an agreement had taken place, their motive was to hold at the
defendant's expense for the period over the five-day maximum or
on

into

what

they

have

testified

is

their

right

to hold

279
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indefinitelyr and their tying up of the stock certificate requiring lengthy litigation, all results in general cheat of a public
that is near helpless.
transaction,

the

The Court has considered the size of the

freezing

of

stock

that

eventually

reached

$30,000, and the assertions of an unconscionable right to hold
the

stock

investors

at

risk

justifies

the award

of punitive

damages in the amount of $10,000.
DATED t h i s ^ J * day of October^-1986.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 9 V

day of October, 1986,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Craig F. McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, #528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald S. Wight
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

CARR, Secretary
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